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2Abstract
The Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement protocol (also called exponential key agreement) was
developed by Diﬃe and Hellman in 1976 and published in the ground-breaking paper “New
Directions in Cryptography”.The protocol allows two users to exchange a secret key over an
insecure medium without any prior secrets. The protocol is vulnerable to various kinds of
attacks, some of which have been discussed in this report.
1 Introduction
The success of the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol lies in the diﬃculty of solving Discrete log Problem
(Refer to 11.2).According to the Diﬃe-Hellman Conjecture, the Diﬃe-Hellman Problem(DHP)
of ﬁnding the shared secret key reduces to solving the DLP, which is a sub-exponential problem.
2 Emergence of public key system
3 Diﬃe-Hellman Protocol
The protocol has two system parameters p and g. They are both public and may be used by
all the users in a system. Parameter p is a prime number and parameter g (usually called a
generator) is an integer less than p, which is capable of generating every element from 1 to p-1
when multiplied by itself a certain number of times, modulo the prime p.Suppose that Alice
and Bob want to agree on a shared secret key using the Diﬃe-Hellman key agreement protocol.
They proceed as follows:
1. First, Alice generates a random private value a and Bob generates a random private value b.
2. Then they derive their public values using parameters p and g and their private values.
3. Alice’s public value is gamodp and Bob’s public value is gbmodp. They then exchange their
public values.
4 Finally, Alice computes k(ab) = (gb)amodp, and Bob computes k(ba) = (ga)bmodp. Since
k(ab) = k(ba) = k, Alice and Bob now have a shared secret key k.
4 Basics of Abstract Algebra
Abstract algebra Abstract algebra is the set of advanced topics of algebra that deal with
abstract algebraic structures rather than the usual number systems. The most important
of these structures are groups, rings, and ﬁelds.
Group A group G is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite set of elements together with a binary operation (called
the group operation) that together satisfy the four fundamental properties of closure,
associativity, the identity property, and the inverse property. The operation with respect
to which a group is deﬁned is often called the ”group operation,” and a set is said to be
a group ”under” this operation. Elements A, B, C, ... with binary operation between A
and B denoted AB form a group if
1. Closure: If A and B are two elements in G, then the product AB is also in G.
2. Associativity: The deﬁned multiplication is associative
3. Identity: There is an identity element I (a.k.a. 1, E, or e)
4. Inverse: There must be an inverse or reciprocal of each element. Therefore, the set
3must contain an element such that for each element of G.
A group is a monoid each of whose elements is invertible. Example: The set of integers
under usual addition is a group.
Ring A ring (in the mathematical sense) is a set S together with two binary operators and
(commonly interpreted as addition and multiplication, respectively) satisfying the follow-
ing conditions:
1. Additive associativity
2. Additive commutativity
3. Additive identity
4. Additive inverse
5. Multiplicative associativity
6. Left and right distributivity
Example: The set of all n-square matrices over real numbers is a ring R with respect to
addition and multiplication.
Field A ﬁeld is any set of elements that satisﬁes the ﬁeld axioms for both addition and multi-
plication and is a commutative division algebra. A ﬁeld with a ﬁnite number of members
is known as a ﬁnite ﬁeld or Galois ﬁeld.Because the identity condition is generally required
to be diﬀerent for addition and multiplication, every ﬁeld must have at least two elements.
Examples include the complex numbers , rational numbers , and real numbers , but not
the integers , which form only a ring. Examples include the complex numbers rational
numbers, and real numbers, but not integers, which form only a ring.
Irreducible Polynomial A polynomial is said to be irreducible if it cannot be factored into
nontrivial polynomials over the same ﬁeld. For Example, in the ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(2),
1 + x + x2 is irreducible, whereas 1 + x2 is not, as it can be factored as (1 + x)(1 + x)
Extension Field A ﬁeld K is said to be an extension ﬁeld (or ﬁeld extension, or extension),
denoted K/F of a ﬁeld F if F is a subﬁeld of K. For Example, the complex numbers are
an extension ﬁeld of the real numbers, and the real numbers are an extension ﬁeld of the
rational numbers.
General Linear Group In abstract algebra, the general linear group of degree n over a ﬁeld
F (written as GL(n,F)) is the group of n-by-n invertible matrices with entries from F,
with the group operation that of ordinary matrix multiplication. (This is indeed a group
because the product of two invertible matrices is again invertible.) If F is a ﬁnite ﬁeld
of order q, then we sometimes write GL(n, q) instead of GL(n, F). If the ﬁeld is R
(the real numbers) or C (the complex numbers), the ﬁeld is sometimes omitted when it
is clear from the context, and we write GL(n). GL(n, F) and subgroups of GL(n, F)
are important in the development of group representations, and also arise in the study
of spatial symmetries and symmetries of vector spaces in general, as well as the study of
polynomials. If F is a ﬁnite ﬁeld with q elements, then GL(n, F) is a ﬁnite group with
(qn−1)(qn−q)(qn−q2)...(qn−qn−1) elements. This can be shown by counting the possible
columns of the matrix: the ﬁrst column can be anything but the zero column; the second
column can be anything but the multiples of the ﬁrst column, etc.
Minimal Polynomial Minimal polynomial of a matrix is the polynomial in of smallest degree
n such that
p(A) =
n X
0
ciAi = 0 (1)
4The minimal polynomial divides any polynomial q with q(A)=0, in particular, it divides
the characteristic polynomial. If the characteristic polynomial factors as
char(A)(x) = (x − λ1)n1.......(x − λk)nk (2)
then its minimal polynomial is
p(x) = (x − λ1)m1.......(x − λk)mk (3)
where 1 ≤ mi ≤ ni
For Example, let
A =
 
1 51
1 1
!
(4)
Then its minimal poynomial is x2 + 51 ∗ x + 3
5 Known attacks on DHP
5.1 Trivial Attacks
Simple Exponents If one of k and l can be easily determined, the protocol can be broken.
For Example
• k = 1 or l = 1
If k or l equals 1 then gk = g or gl = g which any observant attacker will be able to
detect. Thus k and l should not be chosen as 1.
• k = p-1 or l = p-1
If k or l equals p-1 then gp−1 = 1 (Refer to 11.1) and hence the shared secret key
will be equal to 1, which any observant attacker will be able to detect. Thus k and l
should not be chosen as p-1.
Simple Substitution Attack The attack is mounted as follows :
• Oscar intercepts gx and gy and replaces them with 1.
• Both Alice and Bob compute the same shared secret key which equals one.
If the computer program does not realize that gx, gy and gxy cannot equal 1, the
protocol is vulnerable.
5.2 Subgroup Conﬁnement Attack
The generator g in the Diﬃe Hellman protocol is a primitive root of the prime p, i.e. the order
of the group generated by g is equal to p−1. If the selected prime p is such that p−1 has several
small prime factors, then some values between 1 and p−1 do not generate groups of order p−1,
but of subgroups of smaller orders. Hence, within the group of order p − 1 there are subgroups
of smaller orders. If the public parameter of either Alice or Bob lies within one of these small
subgroups, then the shared secret key would be conﬁned to that subgroup. If the order of the
5subgroup is small enough, the intruder may launch a brute force attack to determine the exact
value of the shared secret key.
Example : Let p = 19 and g = 2
Then the group generated by g is
(2, 4, 8, 16, 13, 7, 14, 9, 18, 17, 15, 11, 3, 6, 12, 5, 10, 1)
Now, Let k = 2, A = 22 = 4
Subgroup generated by A = SA = (4, 16, 7, 9, 17, 11, 6, 5, 1)
Let l = 3, B = 23 = 8
Sub-group generated by B = SB = (8, 7, 18, 11, 12, 1)
Kab = 26mod19 = 7
It can be clearly seen from the example above that the shared secret key Kab lies in the inter-
section of the subgroups generated by k and l.
The Solution to counter this kind of an attack is to choose a Safe Prime (Refer to Safe
Primes11.3)
5.3 Composite Order Subgroup Attack
Even if the selected prime is a Safe Prime, there exists a small subgroup of order 2. The attacker
can exploit this fact to launch an attack as follows. Oscar can intercept the messages gk and gl
and exponentiate them by q. (He will replace gk by gkq and gl by glq.) The secret key will be
gklq which allows Oscar to ﬁnd this value by exhaustive search. This is done by noting that the
order of gq = g
(p−1)
2 is 2 1 which implies that the secret key can only take one of two values.
Hence, Oscar can use a brute force search (only two elements to try) in order to determine what
the shared secret key is.
6 DHP over general linear group
We shall denote the general linear group and the algebra of nn matrices over a ﬁnite ﬁeld K as
GLn(K) and Mn(K) or simply as GLn and Mn respectively, whenever the ﬁeld is known from
the context or is irrelevant. The minimal polynomial of a matrix A shall be denoted as h(A, x).
Deﬁnition 1: DHP over GLn . A matrix A in GLn and matrices B = Ak and C = Al are
given for some unknown positive integers k, l ¡ ord A. Determine the matrix Akl = Bl = Ck.
The matrix Akl is called the shared key of the DH protocol. The triple (A,B,C) shall be called
the public data of the DHP
1the subgroup generated by g
(p−1)
2 is (g
(p−1)
2 = p-1, (g
(p−1)
2 )
2 = 1)
66.1 Modulus condition and solution of the DHP
It is of interest to solve this problem for large k, l. For convenience we shall assume that 2n ¡
k, l ¡ ord A in this matrix case throughout this paper. The matrix logarithm problem is that
of solving for k from B and is analyzed in [4]. Clearly, solution of the logarithm leads to the
solution of the DH problem above. We present an approach for solving the DHP which makes
use of the fact that GLn ⊂ Mn. Denote
hc(x) = lcm (h(A, x), h(C, x))
hb(x) = lcm (h(A, x), h(B, x))
Proposition 1.There exist polynomials f(x), g(x) with deg f < deg hc, deg g < deg hb such
that
B = f(A)
Ck = f(C)
and
C = g(A)
Bl = g(B)
Conversely if polynomials f, g satisfy above conditions then f(x) = xk mod hc(x) and g(x) = xl
mod hb(x).
Proof.Let f(x) = xk mod hc(x) and g(x) = xl mod hb(x). Then these polynomials satisfy
the above properties.
Conversely, if B = f(A) and Ck = f(C) (respectively C = g(A) and Bl = g(B)) then xk - f(x)
(resp. xl - g(x)) is an annihilating polynomial of both A and C and hence is divisible by hc(x).
Clearly, since deg f < deg hc it follows that f(x) = xk mod hc(x). Case for g can be proved
similarly.
Remark 1. Note that the numbers k, l are not given as data in the DHP hence the polynomials
f, g cannot be computed from their deﬁnitions above. However the above result guarantees
existence of f, g which can be used to express the shared key. These polynomials f or g can
be found from the relations B = f(A) and C = g(A). In general these equations may not have
unique solutions f, g. It is shown below that unique f, g satisfying these equations exist for a
restricted class of triples (A, k, l). Solutions to these equations nevertheless exist, even though
non-unique in general, and have important implications for PKC.
Deﬁnition 2: The modulus condition. The triple (A, k, l) with A in GLn(K) and 2n < k,
l < ord A, is said to satisfy the modulus condition if any one of the following conditions hold
C1: xk mod h(A, x) = xk mod hc(x)
C2: xl mod h(A, x) = xl mod hb(x)
7Theorem 1. The following statements hold
1. There exists a polynomial f(x) with deg f(x) ¡ deg h(A, x) which satisﬁes B = f(A) and Ck =
f(C) iﬀ (A, k, l) satisﬁes the modulus condition C1. Such a polynomial is unique.
2. There exists a polynomial g(x) with deg g(x) ¡ deg h(A, x) which satisﬁes C = g(A) and Bl
= g(B) iﬀ (A, k, l) satisﬁes the modulus condition C2. Such a polynomial is unique.
Proof. Only the ﬁrst item is proved as the second item follows by similar reasoning. Let
(A, k, l) satisfy condition C1 and choose f(x) = xk mod h(A, x) = xk mod hc(x). Then f satisﬁes
the required conditions. This proves suﬃciency.
Conversely, let f be a polynomial of deg f < deg h(A, x) which satisﬁes B = f(A) and Ck
= f(C). Then xk - f(x) is annihilating for both A and C, hence divisible by their minimal poly-
nomials. Hence xk - f(x) is also divisible by hc(x). Hence f is the unique polynomial which
equals xk mod h(A, x) = xk mod h(C, x) since deg f(x) < deg h(A, x) ≤ deg hc(x). This proves
the necessity.
Remark 2. Note that the equation B = f(A) (resp. C = g(A)) always has a unique solution f
(resp. g) of degree less than that of h(A, x). These equations are linear systems over the ﬁeld
K of ﬁxed size n2 equations in d unknowns where d is the degree of h(A, x) for any k (resp. l).
The shared key Ck (resp. Bl) is then obtained as f(C) (resp. g(B)) for triples (A, k, l) satisfying
the modulus condition C1 (resp. C2) .
6.2 Conjugate class and the Diﬃe-Hellman conjecture
Consider the public data A, B, C of the DH protocol. The problem to be addressed now is to
decide whether the triple (A, k, l) satisﬁes the modulus condition purely from the public data.
This is possible in a special class deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3: A. triple (A, k, l) is said to belong to the conjugate class relative to k if h(A,
x) = h(B, x) and relative to l if h(A, x) = h(C, x).
Theorem 3. The DH conjecture is false for triples (A, k, l) belonging to the conjugate classes
relative to any one of k or l.
Proof. Consider the public data (A,B,C) of the DHP. If the triple (A, k, l) belongs to the
conjugate class relative to l, then it clearly satisﬁes the modulus condition C1. The knowledge
that this is so is obtained only from A and C which belong to the public data. The polynomial
f is now solved from the equation (1) and the shared key equals Ck = f(C). Hence the shared
key is computed purely from the public data. The computation of f moreover does not imply
computation of k or l due to theorem 2. The case of conjugate class relative to k follows similarly.
Examples
In this section we present examples which illustrate the above theory for solving the DHP for
matrices. The parameters used in these problems are of very small sizes and by no means real-
istic. Moreover the condition 2n ¡ k, l is used only for one of k, l as this is su cient to illustrate
the results.
8Example 1. Consider the ﬁeld be F53 and A in GL2 given by
A =
"
1 51
1 1
#
Let k = 3, l = 53 then
A3 = B =
"
48 51
1 48
#
C = A53 =
"
1 2
52 1
#
The shared key is
A53∗3 =
"
48 2
52 48
#
The minimal polynomials are h(A, x) = h(C, x) = x2 + 51x + 3. Now the polynomial So-
lution of the linear system B = f(A) gives f(x) = x + 47. It is easy to see that A533 = f(C).
In this example the exponent l = 53 is of the form pj for j = 1. Where p is the ﬁeld characteristic.
Example 2. In this example h(A, x) = h(C, x) is satisﬁed for exponents k, l which are not
of the form pj . Let the ﬁeld be F13. The matrices A, B and C are given respectively as
A =
"
2 0
0 7
#
B = A3 =
"
8 0
0 5
#
C = A11 =
"
7 0
0 2
#
The shared key Akl is given by
A3∗11 =
"
5 0
0 8
#
Now solving the linear system B = f(A) gives the polynomial f(x) = 2x + 4. Then it can be
seen that f(C) = Akl.
Example 3. This example shows that modulus condition is satisﬁed even if h(A, x) 6= h(C, x).
Let the ﬁeld be F7. The matrix A is chosen as
A =
"
0 5
1 0
#
.
9Let k = 7 and l = 3. Then
B =
"
0 2
6 0
#
.
C =
"
0 4
5 0
#
.
The shared key Akl is
A7∗3 =
"
0 3
2 0
#
Solving the linear system B = f(A) gives f(x) = 6x. Then the shared key can be computed as
A21 = 6C. Here h(A, x) = x2 + 2 and h(C, x) = x2 + 1. Since k = 7, we get 6x = x7 mod
h(A, x) = x7 mod h(C, x). In the next section we show ways to extend results of this section
to extension ﬁelds Fpm, which lead to the solution of the DHP for an analogous class of triples
such as those satisfying the modulus condition and for the conjugate class above.
7 DHP over general extension ﬁeld
The conditions derived above for General Linear Group also hold for Extension Fields.
For extension ﬁeld (Fpm), the values of k and l satisfying the conjugate class condition are of
the form
prmodn
For Example Assume extension ﬁeld of prime ﬁeld 2 over irreducible polynomial x3 + x + 1
Let g be the generator of the extension ﬁeld.
Hence, g3 + g + 1 = 0
Take k = 6 and l = 2
Now,
A = gk = g6 = g2 + 1 = f(g) B = gl = g2
Shared key is
g12 = g7.g5 = g5 = g2 + g + 1
Also,
f(B) = f(g2) = g4 + 1 = g2 + g + 1
8 DHP over elliptic curves
9 Conclusion
10 Our Observations
10.1 Weak key in Diﬃe Hellman
If either of the parties Alice or Bob, selects its private key as
(p−1)
2 , then the public parameter
for that party would be p − 1. Hence, if the public parameter is p − 1, an intruder can
10safely assume that the private key is
(p−1)
2 . Hence the private key
(p−1)
2 is a weak key and
should not be used.
10.2 Comparison between the Composite Order Subgroup attack and the
Man-in-the-middle attack
On the surface, the Composite Order Subgroup attack (Section refsec:compOrderSubGrp)
may appear similar to a simple Man-in-the-middle attack. However, the Composite Order
Subgroup attack is a more sophisticated attack. In the regular Man-in-the-middle attack,
the intruder would have to share a secret key each with Alice and Bob. Using these secret
keys, every message being sent by Alice to Bob would ﬁrst have to be decrypted by the
intruder using the secret key shared with Alice, and would then have to be encrypted using
the secret key shared with Bob. Hence, in the Man-in-the-middle attack, the intruder
would have to be an active listener. On the other hand, in the Composite Order Subgroup
attack, once a shared secret key has been established between Alice and Bob, the intruder
needs to determine the key using brute-force technique (As mentioned in Section 5.3).
Once the intruder knows the shared secret, he can passively listen to the messages being
exchanged between Alice and Bob.
10.3 Vulnerabilities in DHP over extension ﬁelds
(To be written again)
11 Appendix
11.1 Fermat’s Little Theorem
If p is prime and p is not a factor of a, then
ap−1 = 1modp
11.2 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The problem of ﬁnding r such that gr = d, where d and g are elements in a given group.
The discrete logarithm problem has a sub exponential complexity.
11.3 Safe Primes
Safe primes are prime numbers of the form p = 2q + 1 where q is prime. Such primes
have various cryptographic advantages.
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